Abstract: The paper analyzes the Nash equilibria of two-person discounted repeated games with one-sided incomplete information and known own payo®s. If the informed player is arbitrarily patient relative to the uninformed player, then the characterization for the informed player's payo®s is essentially the same as that in the undiscounted case. This implies that even small amounts of incomplete information can lead to a discontinuous change in the equilibrium payo® set. For the case of equal discount factors, however, and under an assumption that strictly individually rational payo®s exist, a result akin to the Folk Theorem holds when a complete information game is perturbed by a small amount of incomplete information.
Introduction
In this paper we consider discounted non-zero-sum repeated games between two players with one-sided incomplete information and known own payo®s. We shall investigate equilibrium payo®s as the players become patient. We consider two cases concerning relative discount factors. Our¯rst main result, in Section 3, states that for arbitrary given initial beliefs, for a¯xed value of the uninformed player's (player 2) discount factor, and if the informed player's (player 1) discount factor is su±ciently close to one, the equilibrium payo®s to player 1 (for each of a¯nite number of types) must approximately satisfy the conditions of an equilibrium in which the informed player acts to reveal her information at the start of the game. This implies a continuity result 1 with the undiscounted case:
holding prior beliefs constant, as the players' discount factors go to one, if player 1's discount factor goes to one su±ciently fast relative to that of player 2, then the limiting set of equilibrium payo®s for player 1 must satisfy the necessary conditions appropriate for the model with no discounting. In Section 4, the symmetric discounting case is analysed.
Under an assumption on the existence of strictly individually rational payo®s, we establish a continuity result with complete information games as the probability of one of the types goes to one: for any degree of approximation, provided the players are su±ciently patient and provided initial beliefs put su±ciently high probability on this type, then given any feasible strictly individually rational payo® vector in the game between this type and player 2, there is a Nash equilibrium of the incomplete information game with approximately these payo®s (to this type of player 1 and to player 2). Since there is no such continuity result for undiscounted games as the size of the perturbation goes to zero, it can be concluded that the equilibrium characterization which exists for the undiscounted case is only the limit (as discount factors go to one, holding beliefs constant) of the discounted case if the limit is taken in a particular way, and notably it is not the limit of the discounted case if both players' discount factors are equal.
The situation where one or more players' preferences may be unknown to the opponent(s) has received relatively little attention in the non-zero-sum discounted repeated games literature, despite considerable work on`reputation' models where perturbations of preferences are in terms of irrational or commitment types. Undiscounted repeated games 1 This continuity property is not uniform with respect to initial beliefs. player 1. Hence p k will denote the prior probability of type k. We shall assume that each type has strictly positive probability: p k > 0 for all k. In every period t = 0; 1; 2; : : :, player 1 selects an \action" i t out of a¯nite action space I, while player 2 simultaneously chooses an action j t from the¯nite set J, where I and J have at least two elements.
Payo®s at stage t to type k of player 1 and to player 2 are respectivelyA k (i t ; j t ) and B(i t ; j t ). Player i discounts payo®s with discount factor ± i 2 (0; 1), with the payo® to type k of player 1 beingã k = (1 ¡ ± 1 ) P 1 t=0 ± t 1 A k (i t ; j t ), and that to player 2 being b = (1 ¡ ± 2 ) P 1 t=0 ± t 2 B(i t ; j t ). Both players observe the realized action pro¯le (i t ; j t ) after each period. Let H t = (I £ J) t+1 be the set of all possible histories h t up to and including period t. A (behavioral) strategy for type k of player 1 is a sequence
We de¯ne ¾ = (¾ k ) k2K . Likewise, a strategy for player 2 is a sequence of maps ¿ = (¿ 0 ; ¿ 1 ; ¢ ¢ ¢), ¿ t : H t¡1 ! ¢ J . The prior probability distribution p, together with a pair of strategies (¾; ¿ ), will induce a probability distribution over in¯nite histories and hence over discounted payo®s. We use E p;¾;¿ to denote expectations with respect to this distribution, and abbreviate to E where there is no ambiguity. Players are assumed to maximize expected payo®s, and a Nash equilibrium is de¯ned as a pair of strategies (¾; ¿ ) such that, for each k, E p;¾;¿ [ã k j k]¸E p;¾ 0 ;¿ [ã k j k]
for all ¾ 0 , and E p;¾;¿ [b]¸E p;¾;¿ 0 [b] for all ¿ 0 . Finally we shall need the following. Let a k := min g2¢ J max f 2¢ I A k (f; g) be type k's minmax payo®, where we use the notational abuse that A k (f; g) is the expected value of A k (i; j) when mixed actions f and g are followed. Likewise player 2's minmax payo® is given byb := min f 2¢ I max g2¢ J B(f; g).
A Relatively Patient Informed Player
We start by considering the case where the discount factor of player 2 is taken as¯xed, and we let the discount factor of player 1, the informed player, go to one. This case corresponds closely to the undiscounted case; necessary conditions which must be satis¯ed by player 1's payo®s in the undiscounted case must also be (asymptotically) satis¯ed in the discounted case as ± 1 ! 1. These necessary conditions can be interpreted as requiring payo® equivalence to some fully revealing equilibrium. Hart (1985) gave a complete characterization for the general class of undiscounted games (payo®s evaluated according to a Banach limit) with one-sided incomplete information, which includes the possibility that the uninformed player is unaware of his own payo® function. For the case we are interested in, namely \known own payo®s" but where one of the players does not know the payo®s of the other player, a simpler characterization has been provided by Shalev (1994) (see also Koren (1988) , and Forges (1992) for a survey of the literature.) Denote this game by ¡(p; 1; 1). We shall show that essentially the same characterization as that of Shalev can be obtained for the discounted case provided the informed player is arbitrarily patient relative to the uninformed player.
We de¯ne¯rst individual rationality in this setting. Punishment strategies for player 2 are more complex than in the complete information setting, because all possible types of player 1 must simultaneously be punished. Let x := (x k ) k2K 2 < K be a vector of payo®s for the types of player 1. For q 2 ¢ K , let a(q) be player 1's minmax payo® in the one-shot game with payo®s given by P k2K q k A k (i; j).The set of payo®s fy 2 < K jy · xg is said to be approachable by player 2 if and only if q ¢ x¸a(q) for all q 2 ¢ K :
Blackwell's approachability result (Blackwell (1956) ) then implies that player 2 has a strategy, ¿ , that guarantees type k gets average (i.e., undiscounted) payo®s of no more than x k whatever strategy, ¾, player 1 uses. Thus if the set fyjy · xg is approachable then x is a vector of feasible punishment payo®s for player 2 to impose on the types of player 1. We will say that the vector x = (x k ) k2K is individually rational (IR) if the set fyjy · xg is approachable. For player 2 the de¯nition of individual rationality is the usual one from complete information repeated games: a payo® y for player 2 is individually rational if y¸b: (2) Let ¼ = (¼ ij ) i;j 2 ¢ I£J be a joint distribution over I £ J (i.e., a correlated strategy).
This will generate a vector of payo®s for player 1 and a payo® for player 2 of A k (¼) = P i2I;j2J ¼ ij A k (i; j) and B(¼) = P i2I;j2J ¼ ij B(i; j) respectively. Let ¦ = (¢ IJ ) K be the set of all correlated strategy pro¯les for each type, (¼ k ) k2K . Then
De¯nition 1 De¯ne ¦ 0 ½ ¦ to be the subset of pro¯les satisfying conditions (i) (individual rationality): (A k (¼ k )) k2K is individually rational for player 1, and B(¼ k ) is individually rational for player 2 for each k 2 K, and (ii) (incentive compatibility): Shalev (1994) showed that payo®s (a; b) are Nash equilibrium payo®s of ¡(p; 1; 1) if and only if there exists a pro¯le of correlated strategies (¼ k ) k2K 2 ¦ 0 such that A k (¼ k ) = a k for all k 2 K and
The¯rst main result needed is Lemma 2, which states that equilibrium play between type k and player 2, as summarised in the average (using player 1's discount factor in the weighted average) frequencies over action pro¯les, must approximately satisfy the individual rationality condition of De¯nition 1 for player 2. Its proof depends on two main ideas. First (Lemma 1), if player 2's equilibrium strategy gives him less thanb when he plays against k, then he must anticipate that the probability distribution over outcomes if he is facing type k's strategy di®ers from the one generated by the \expected" equilibrium strategy of player 1 (averaging over all possible types using player 2's beliefs). Furthermore, because player 2 discounts future payo®s, there must be a signi¯cant di®erence between these distributions in the not too distant future. The second idea (Result 1) states that if player 1 follows type k's strategy, then player 2 cannot continue to believe that the true probability distribution over outcomes is signi¯cantly di®erent from the one generated by type k's strategy. Taken together, these results imply that if player 1 plays according to type k's strategy, then player 2 cannot continue to respond with a strategy which gives him less thanb against this strategy. Eventually he will learn that his opponent is playing type k's strategy, and he will choose a response which gives him at least his minmax payo®. For a¯xed value of ± 2 , Result 1 implies an upper bound on how long this learning takes. Consequently if a su±ciently high discount factor (i.e. ± 1 as opposed to ± 2 ) is used to evaluate player 2's payo®s, this learning phase will be insigni¯cant and player 2 must get approximately his minmax payo® against type k.
For a¯xed equilibrium, we de¯ne the average frequencies over action pro¯les conditional on type k when the discount factor is ± as:
t=0 ± t 1fi; j; tgj k] ; for each i and j, where 1fi; j; tg is the indicator function for the action pro¯le (i; j) occurring at date t. It is easy to check that the equilibrium payo®s are 
; using obvious notation) and likewise q N (¢ j h t ; k) the distribution conditional additionally upon player 1's true type being k (de¯ned for h t having positive probability conditional on type k). We de¯ne for any two distributions
Finally, de¯ne the continuation payo® for player 1 type k, discounted to period t + 1, as:ã
and that for player 2 asb
Lemma 1 Let ± 2 2 (0; 1) and ² > 0 be given and consider any Nash equilibrium and any history h t which has positive probability in this equilibrium conditional upon type k.
Suppose that conditional upon player 1 being type k the expected continuation payo® for player 2 is
Then there exists a¯nite integer N and a number´> 0, both depending only on ± 2 and ², such that
The next result shows that if player 1 follows the strategy of type k, then there can be only a¯nite number of periods in which the probability distribution over outcomes predicted by player 2 di®ers signi¯cantly from the true distribution. Eventually, player 2 will predict future play (almost) correctly. Given integers N and n, with N > 0 and 0 · n < N, de¯ne the set T (n; N ) = fn; n+N; n+2N; : : :g. The result is a straightforward adaptation of the main theorem of Fudenberg and Levine (1992, Theorem 4 .1) which is stated for the case N = 1.
Result 1 (Fudenberg and Levine) Given integers N and n, with N > 0 and 0 · n < N , and for every » > 0, Ã > 0 and a type k of player 1 with p k > 0, there is an m depending only on N , », Ã, and p k such that for any (¾; ¿ ) and any h t consistent with (¾; ¿ ), the probability, conditional on player 1's true type being k, that there are more than m periods t 2 T (n; N) with
is less than ».
Lemma 2 states that equilibrium play between type k and player 2, as summarised in the average (using player 1's discount factor in the weighted average) frequencies over action pro¯les, must approximately satisfy the individual rationality condition of De¯ni-tion 1 for player 2 (see Cripps et al. (1996) for a related argument in the`reputation' context).
Lemma 2 Given ± 2 < 1 and for any Á > 0, there exists a ± 1 < 1 such that whenever ± 1 < ± 1 < 1, the average frequencies over action pro¯les for each k 2 K in any Nash equilibrium, calculated using discount factor
Proof: Fix an equilibrium and a type k and choose ² = Á=3 in Lemma 1; then there is an N and an´such that (4) holds whenever (3) holds. Set Ã =´in Result 1, take any integer n, 0 · n < N, and set » = Á 3N(b¡b min ) (assuming thatb > b min ; the lemma is trivial otherwise). Then by Result 1 there is an m (¯nite) such that the probability that inequality (4) holds more than m times in T (n; N) is less than », so the probability that inequality (3) holds more than m times in T (n; N) must also be less than ». Hence, considering all values for n, 0 · n < N, we have that the probability, conditional upon type k, that the inequality
holds more than Nm times is smaller than N» =
Hence, player 2's payo® against type k in the equilibrium, calculated using player 1's discount factor, is
Using the result on the number of times (7) holds, for ± 1 > ± 2 the random variable
with probability at least (1 ¡ N») conditional on k, where we are using the fact that in the event that (7) fails no more than Nm times, subtracting (b ¡ b min ) Nm times undiscounted yields a payo® lower than the minimum possible. The random variable is at least
b min otherwise. Using this in (8) gives a lower bound, say ©(± 1 ; ± 2 ), so that B(¼ k (± 1 ))¸©(± 1 ; ± 2 ), and notice that ©(± 1 ; ± 2 ) is independent of the particular equilibrium studied. Next, taking the limit as ± 1 ! 1 yields lim
N»b min ; hence,
, we get lim
such that ©(± 1 ; ± 2 ) is within
depends only upon p k , Á and ± 2 ), we have for
1 g and the result follows.
Q.E.D.
We are now in a position to establish that Shalev's equilibrium characterization holds approximately as a necessary condition provided that player 1 is su±ciently patient relative to player 2. This theorem is a characterization of the equilibrium payo®s of player 1 only: since di®erent discount factors are being used, the usual feasibility constraint on the average payo® pro¯le across both players does not apply. First we need to de¯ne the set of payo® vectors which player 1 can receive in equilibrium in the undiscounted case (i.e., the projection of the equilibrium payo® set onto the space of player 1's payo®s). Recall that ¦ 0 is the set of all correlated strategy pro¯les which satisfy individual rationality and incentive compatibility. We de¯ne
We can state Theorem 1 Let ± 2 , 0 < ± 2 < 1, and p À 0 be¯xed. Then for any ² > 0 there exists a ± 1 < 1 such that for all 1 > ± 1 > ± 1 , if player 1 has equilibrium payo®s a in ¡(p; ± 1 ; ± 2 ),
Proof: We take ± 2 and p to be¯xed throughout the proof. First consider condition (i) of De¯nition 1 of ¦ 0 , individual rationality (for player 1). Let (¾; ¿ ) be a Nash equilibrium pair of strategies for the game ¡(p; ± 1 ; ± 2 ), and suppose that the equilibrium payo® pro¯le for player 1, a = (A k (¼ k (± 1 ))) k2K , is not individually rational. Then by (1), there exists
. By the minimax theorem,
so that if player 1 plays a mixed action f ¤ which attains the maximum in (12),
Denote by ¾ ¤ the repeated game strategy in which player 1 plays the mixed action f ¤ each period and independently of type k. Then
since given that ¾ ¤ does not vary with type, conditioning on k does not a®ect the distribution over histories. Because q ¤ 2 ¢ K , it follows that E p;¾ ¤ ;¿ [ã k j k] > a k for at least one k, contradicting the de¯nition of equilibrium. Hence individual rationality must be satis¯ed for player 1 for any value of ± 1 ; that is, a satis¯es (1). Next, condition (ii) of De¯nition 1 (incentive compatibility) must be satis¯ed for any ± 1 , 0 < ± 1 < 1, since in any
is the equilibrium payo® of type k of player 1, and
) is the payo® type k would get from following the strategy of type k 0 ).
Finally, individual rationality for player 2 must be dealt with. De¯nê
and de¯ne the compact valued correspondence
Since ª is clearly an upper hemi-continuous function of Á, it follows that the correspondence given by ª \¦, which is non-empty (Shalev (1994) ), is also upper hemi-continuous. Theorem 1 developed necessary conditions which equilibrium payo®s must satisfy asymptotically. In the undiscounted model, the necessary conditions were also su±cient. A similar result can be established with discounting provided the inequalities in the conditions of De¯nition 1 are assumed to hold strictly (as they will at any interior point of Shalev's set). We say that a payo® vector a is strictly individually rational for player 1 if there exists some individually rational point x with a k > x k for all k.
Moreover, if the linear function
is strictly individually rational for player 1, and B(¼ k ) is strictly individually rational for player 2 for each k 2 K, and (ii) :
Then for any ² > 0 there exists a ± such that whenever 1 > ± 1 , ± 2 > ±, there exists a Nash equilibrium of ¡(p; ± 1 ; ± 2 ) with
The proof is straightforward and is omitted; it follows closely the argument for the undiscounted case given in Koren (1988) which constructs a completely revealing joint plan, with each type k revealing itself during the¯rst few periods and thereafter playing approximately according to ¼ k . One complication which arises is the punishment of player 1; see Section 4 for a discussion of Blackwell punishment strategies with discounting.
Symmetric Discounting
In this section we consider games where the two players are equally patient. We denote this class of games by ¡(p; ±), so ¡(p; ±) := ¡(p; ±; ±). We show, in a sense to be made more precise, that the (Nash) Folk Theorem for complete information games is robust to small perturbations in the information structure; speci¯cally it can be extended to the repeated games ¡(p; ±) when p 1 is close to one. In the previous section, by contrast, the that there exists ± º ; p º 1 < 1 such that the pair (a 1 ; b) can be approximately sustained as equilibrium payo®s in ¡(p; ±) if ± > ± º and p 1 > p º 1 . Thus introducing a small amount of uncertainty about the type of player 1 does not reduce the set of equilibrium payo®s in any signi¯cant way when both of the players are su±ciently, and equally, patient.
Example
To illustrate what is to come, we consider an example, where 2 > c¸1 (which satis¯es (A.1) below provided c > 1). In this example, Shalev's (1994) Section 3) imply that for c < 2; there is a lower bound on type 1's equilibrium payo® in the undiscounted case strictly above her minmax payo® of 3=4; individual rationality for type 2 and for player 2 (A 2 (¼ 2 )¸1; B(¼ 2 )¸3=4), together with incentive compatibility,
(This is clearest for the case where c = 1;
Here we show in the symmetric discounting case that as ± ! 1; a 1 can be driven down to 3=4:
Let ² > 0 be given. Consider¯rst the following (pooling) equilibrium of ¡ (p; ±) : both types of player 1 play U and player 2 plays L in every period, irrespective of past history.
Player 1 gets (3; c) and player 2 gets a payo® of 1 (this plays the role of the equilibrium of Lemma 5). This will be our \terminal equilibrium". Next, precede this equilibrium by the repeated play of (T; R) by both types and by player 2 ((T; R) plays the role of ¼ 2 in Lemma 6, and is played to reduce type 1's payo®; note that z as de¯ned there, using this ¼ 2 ; is individually rational: player 2 need only play a punishment strategy which minmaxes type 1; the \¯nite sequence" of Lemma 7 is just a single play of (T; R)). Punishments in all earlier periods involve player 2 being minmaxed thereafter for observable deviations, and type 1 being minmaxed for observable deviations by player 1 (so type 2 gets (3 + c)=4
after any observable deviation); in the general proof we shall need to vary the punishment with type 1's payo®. The constraint that limits the length of the phase where (T; R)
is played in such a pooling equilibrium concerns player 2's individual rationality. Thus (T; R) is played out N times before the above terminal equilibrium is played, where N is the largest integer satisfying (1 ¡ ± N )0 + ± N 1¸(1 ¡ ±)3 + ±3=4 (the LHS is player 2's payo® from the strategy speci¯ed, and he can get at most 1 in the period of deviation and is minmaxed thereafter). When ± is close to 1; ± N is close to 3=4; so player 2's payo® is also close to 3=4 : there exists ± ¤ (²) < 1 such that for ± > ± ¤ (²), player 2's payo® ± N is within ²=3 of 3=4; 3 and thus type 1's payo® ± N 3 is no more than ² above 9=4: Payo®s to type 1 and player 2 at this (pooling) equilibrium are shown by point C in Figure 1 .
To reduce type 1's payo® further, we introduce a randomization by type 1 in thē rst period of this equilibrium: suppose that type 1 plays B with probability q such that p 1 q = 0:5, where p 1 is player 2's prior at the start of the period (so that from player 2's point of view B is played with probability 0:5). If B is played, so that player 1 signals she 3 The continuation payo® received by player 2 at any date can change between consecutive dates by at most 2M (1 ¡ ±) < ²=6 for ± > 1 ¡ ²=12M = 1 ¡ ²=36; likewise the RHS of the inequality de¯ning N given above is within ²=6 of 3=4 if ± > 1 ¡ is type 1; then from the start of the following period an equilibrium of © 1 (±) is played in which, to ensure type 1's indi®erence, the payo® to type 1, say x; satis¯es (1 ¡ ±)1 + ±x = ± N 3; and player 2 gets 4 ¡ x (on the frontier of feasible set). Consequently payo®s at this equilibrium to type 1 and player 2 are (3±
after substitution for x: The purpose of the randomization is to increase the payo® that player 2 receives so as to relax his incentive compatibility constraint, thus allowing further plays of (T; R): The equilibrium just described (see point D in the¯gure) now replaces the initially described pooling equilibrium in a repetition of the argument. N 0 rounds of (T; R) are added at the start until again player 2's individual rationality constraint binds:
Repeating the argument given earlier, for
is within ²=3 of 3=4: Again add an initial randomization of say q 0 of playing B by type 1 so that p 0 1 q 0 = 0:5, where p 0 1 is player 2's prior at the start of the period, and an equilibrium of the complete information game played by type 1 and player 2, which we denote © 1 (±); with payo®s (y; 4 ¡ y) to follow. Payo®s are then
² < e ² for some e ² > 0 and ± > ± ¤ (²), lie above the 45 o line being su±ciently close to (27=20; 17=10). 4 A further repetition of the argument, so that more plays of (T; R) are appended at the beginning, then implies that the payo® of type 1 will reach 3=4 before that of player 2 does, so that the latter constraint no longer prevents type 1 receiving a low payo®. By choosing ² < e ² small enough, type 1 can be held as close to 3/4 as desired provided ± > ± ¤ (²). Observable deviations cannot be optimal as all continuation payo®s are above punishment levels: this is clear for type 1 and for player 2; type 2 gets a continuation payo® of (1 ¡ ± n )1 + ± n c where there are n periods to go before the¯nal pooling equilibrium, and ±
n¸1
=4 by type 1's individual rationality; whereas deviation yields at most ±(3+c)=4. We also need to check that type 2 cannot bene¯t from mimicking type 1 revealing her type; since the equilibria with payo®s (x; 4 ¡ x) and (y; 4 ¡ y) involve play°uctuating between (T; L) and (B; R) with less weight on the former than on the equilibrium path, mimicking cannot be pro¯table. As there were two randomizations (at each of which the total probability of player 1 revealing herself to be type 1 is 1=2), the strategies above are an equilibrium of ¡ (p; ±) provided p 1¸3 =4: To obtain higher payo®s to type 1; it is only necessary to stop the above process earlier; to obtain arbitrary payo®s to player 2, we append an initial randomization by type 1, as described earlier, but in which the equilibrium of © 1 (±) gives player 2 close to the desired payo®s. Provided type 1's probability is su±ciently close to 1, this will provide any desired degree of approximation.
In what follows, we shall split the above constructions into two steps,¯rst ignoring type k = 2 and constructing the equilibrium as an equilibrium of a complete information game, before introducing the possibility of a second type. Finally we deal with more than two types.
An Equilibrium of the Complete Information Game
The¯rst step in our argument is the construction of an equilibrium of the complete information game played by type 1 and player 2, © 1 (±). In Lemma 4 we construct a particular type of equilibrium where any feasible and strictly individually rational payo®
7=10 ¡ ¢; and thus there exists e ² > 0 such that for ² < e ² payo®s lie above the 45 o line.
to type 1 can be obtained as an equilibrium payo®. In Section 4.2 we shall use these equilibrium strategies to construct an equilibrium of a two-type incomplete information game.
Some additional notation is now necessary. De¯ne the set of feasible and (uniformly for a given ²) strictly individually rational payo®s for the complete information game between type k and player 2:
We also use M to denote an upper bound on the absolute magnitude of the players' payo®s, so that M¸jA k (i; j)j; jB(i; j)j, for all (i; j), k. De¯ne the function f , where
to be the maximum feasible payo® to player 2 given that type 1
made up of a¯nite number of linear segments. De¯ne S to be the maximum absolute value of the slopes of these segments (this is¯nite).
We start with two preliminary results. The¯rst is an approximation result which allows correlated strategies to be approximated by average behaviour along deterministic sequences of action pro¯les.
Result 2 Let ² > 0 be given. There is a±(²) < 1 such that if ± >±(²) and given any correlated strategy ¼ 2 ¢ IJ , then there exists a sequence of actions f(i t ; j t )g 1 t=0 such that:
in which a single randomization occurs. The proof of Lemma 4 will require the iteration of this construction. Take ² > 0 to be given and also a sequence f(
and an arbitrary (a
Type 1 : In period 0 play{ 0 with probability 1/2 and{ 6 ={ 0 with probability 1/2. If ({ 0 ;| 0 ) is played in period zero, continue to play the sequence f{ t g T ¡1 t=0
n times and then in period nT begin playing the equilibrium strategy to get the payo®s (a
is played in period zero, play the in¯nite sequence of stage-game actions, determined by Result 2, to get the payo®s
(Both payo®s are equilibrium payo®s by the assumption that ± > ±(²).) Minmax all deviations by player 2.
Player 2 : In period 0 play|
t=0 n times and then in period nT begin playing the equilibrium strategy to get the payo®s (a
in period zero play the in¯nite sequence of stage-game actions, determined by Result 2, to get the payo®s (x; f (x)) 2 G 1 (2²). Minmax all deviations by player 1.
Call the strategies de¯ned above3(n; a ¤ 1 ; b ¤ ; x) for type 1 and¿ (n; a ¤ 1 ; b ¤ ; x) for player 2 (we suppress the implicit dependence of the continuation equilibria on ±). Also de¯ne the strategies3(n; a ¤ 1 ; b ¤ ) for type 1 and¿ (n; a ¤ 1 ; b ¤ ) for player 2, which are the same as3(n; a ¤ 1 ; b ¤ ; x) and¿ (n; a ¤ 1 ; b ¤ ; x) except that they do not involve a randomization in period 0, that is, type 1 always plays{ 0 in period zero. De¯ne payo®s when there are n complete rounds of the sequence to be played as a 1 (n) :
We will now establish the following result.
Lemma 3 Let ² > 0 be given; also let f(
, and let (a
, where n¸1 is the largest integer satisfying
Proof: We will¯rst show that n¸1. We have
By our assumption on a ¤ 1 and (1 ¡ ± T )2M < ²=2 by the assumption on ±, the bottom line is positive. A similar argument shows b(1) >b + 2².
To prove (i), the strategies are an equilibrium of © 1 (±) provided: (a) type 1 is indi®erent when she randomizes in period zero, and (b) no player prefers to deviate when playing out the sequence f(
t=0 n times. Part (ii) follows if (b) holds. Type 1 is indi®erent in period zero if we can¯nd an equilibrium with the payo®s (x; f (x)) 2 G 1 (2²) where the payo® x satis¯es
But (16) implies that ja 1 (n) ¡ xj < 2M (1 ¡ ±)=± < ²=2, where the last inequality follows from our assumptions on ±. This implies a 1 (2²) < x < ¹ a 1 (2²); the lower bound follows as a 1 (n) satis¯es a 1 (2²)+²=2 < a 1 (n), and the upper bound is true since x · a
So there exists a pair (x; f (x)) 2 G 1 (2²) where x satis¯es (16).
Type 1's expected payo® from continuing to play the sequence when there are t periods of the current sequence and n 0 · n repetitions of the sequence left to play satis¯es
This follows as a 1 (n 0 )¸a 1 (n). Type 1's payo® from deviation is bounded above by (1 ¡ ± T )M +± Tâ 1 , so a su±cient condition for deviation not to be pro¯table,
given in the proposition. An identical argument using the fact that b(n 0 )¸minfb(n); b ¤ g shows that player 2 also does not bene¯t from deviating when they are playing out the sequence n times.
Q.E.D.
In the next lemma, we start with an equilibrium of © 1 (±) with payo®s (a
to the maximum feasible and individually rational payo® to type 1 in G 1 (3²). Using this equilibrium we¯nd a new equilibrium with the payo®s (a 1 (n);
, where, by construction, a 1 (n) < a ¤ 1 . If the payo®s at this new equilibrium satisfy (a 1 (n); (b(n) + (1 ¡ ±)B({;| 0 ) + ±f(x))=2) 2 G 1 (3²) and the condition a 1 (2²) + ² < a 1 (n) then it is possible to apply the lemma a second time to¯nd a further equilibrium of © 1 (±) where type 1 receives the payo® a 1 (n + n 0 ) < a 1 (n) < a ¤ 1 . Again if this new equilibrium gives payo®s in G 1 (3²) and satisfying the same condition, it will be possible to iterate the lemma a third time, to¯nd further equilibria of © 1 (±) where type 1 receives even lower payo®s, and so on.
We de¯ne (3(N);¿ (N)) to be the strategies that iteratively apply Lemma 3 to the equilibrium with payo®s (a
t=0 is played out in total N times; each iteration uses the strategies (3;¿ ) de¯ned above Lemma 3except for the last which uses (3;¿ ) (so there is no initial randomization). (The dependence on ±, ² and Lemma 4 Let ² > 0 and C > 0 be given and let f(
and ± ¤ (²) < 1 be so that
, and ± >±(²); then there exists an N such that
is an equilibrium of © 1 (±) with a payo® to type 1 of a 1 (N) within ²=32 of a 1 , and at this equilibrium type 1 departs from repeated play of the sequence f(
(by playing{ instead of{ 0 at the points of randomisation) with a total probability of at most 1 ¡ r.
bound on ± implies that if x and y are any two feasible payo®s for player i, then
We will¯rst show that the payo® to type 1 at the equilibrium (3(N max );¿ (N max )) is no greater than a 1 (4 1 16 ²) + ². It is impossible to apply Lemma 3 another time if a 1 (N max ) · a 1 (2²) + ², but in this case the result is proved. We will now suppose that a 1 (N max ) > a 1 (2²) + ², which implies that in the last feasible iteration of Lemma 3 the constraint a 1 (n) > a 1 (2²) + ²=2 does not bind (cf. the argument in the¯rst paragraph of the proof of Lemma 3). Thus, instead, in the last feasible iteration of Lemma 3 the constraint b(n) >b + 2² binds and Lemma 3 cannot be reapplied because (a 1 (n); (b(n) +
(1 ¡ ±)B({;| 0 ) + ±f(x))=2) 6 2 G 1 (3²). There are now two separate cases to consider: (1) If
) is in the feasible set and is within ²=16 of the point (x; f (x)), by (17). We know that f(x) <b + 4 1 16 ², from (17) and (18). It therefore follows that ².
The payo® to type 1 at the equilibrium (3(N max );¿ (N max )) is thus no greater than a 1 (4 1 16 ²) + ². Therefore, type 1's payo® at the equilibrium (3(N);¿ (N )) ranges from less than a 1 (4
. By (17), type 1's payo® at the equilibrium (3(N );¿ (N)) increases by at most ²=16 as N increases in integer steps.
Thus there must be a value N for which type 1's payo® is within ²=32 of any point in
Fix a particular (a ¤ 1 ; b ¤ ) satisfying the conditions of the lemma statement and a ± > ±(²). The equilibrium (3(N max );¿ (N max )) is well de¯ned, so: there are only a¯nite number of periods when the sequence f(
t=0 is played and there are only a¯nite number of occasions when type 1 randomizes over the actions{ 0 and{. Thus, there is a strictly positive probability r of always playing{ 0 and not deviating from the sequence. We now need to prove that the number of randomizations between n = N max and n = 0 is bounded above by a number independent of ± and (a
For a given ± and (a
the equilibrium (3(N max );¿ (N max )), let a 1 (n) and a 1 (n + n 0 ) be player 1's payo® at two consecutive randomizations (assuming there are at least 2 randomizations). Recall that there is no randomization at the start of the last iteration, so n + n 0 < N max . We must
where x is chosen as in (16). (Note: if there are any randomizations, thenB <b + 2².)
By de¯nition of there being a randomization at n + n 0 the inequality in (19) must be violated for n + n 0 + 1 (since the constraint a 1 (n + n 0 ) > a 1 (2²) + 1 2 ² can only bind | in the sense that additional play of the sequence f(
t=0 would lead to its violation | at n + n 0 = N max ), and since ± T is bounded below by the assumption ± >± there is an upper bound on ± T n 0 :
ButÂ 1 <â 1 + ², so the upper bound on ± n 0 T gives an upper bound on a 1 (n + n 0 ):
A su±cient condition for the term in braces to be strictly bounded below unity for all ± >±(²) is that there exists an´> 0 such that
Subtracting unity from each side and then noticing that the denominator of the right is strictly less than 2M gives the following su±cient condition
Let f (a 1 ) = G + Ha 1 be the equation of the tangent to the frontier of the feasible set at a 1 . Substituting this in for f (:) and then for x from (16) and multiplying by 2:
The last term on the right is positive by (14). The second last term equals (1 ¡ ±)(G + Hx¡B({;| 0 )+H(A 1 ({;| 0 )¡x))), which is bounded above by (1¡±)(S +1)2M , as jHj · S.
By the assumption that ± >±(²); a su±cient condition for (21) and hence for (20) is
The construction of the strategies ensures that a 1 (n) · a ¤ 1 < ¹ a 1 (2²) ¡ ²=2, so at a 1 (n) the maximum feasible payo® to player 2 is at leastb + 2². The line G + Ha 1 graphs payo®s to player 2 that are weakly greater than his maximum feasible payo® so G+Ha 1 (n)¸b+2².
(17) ensures that b(n) is within ²=16 ofb, so the right of the above expression is at least 2² ¡ ²=16. We have shown that after the¯rst randomization the value a 1 (n) ¡Â 1 declines (at least) exponentially with each randomization at some constant rate, say Ã < 1, so
(where n and (n + n 0 ) refer to consecutive randomizations, as before).
Thus even if the¯rst iteration (i.e., up to the¯rst randomization) had an arbitrarily small e®ect, and since a 1 at the¯rst randomization is bounded above by ¹ a 1 , it follows that after h
we can be certain that at most h ¤ randomizations are required before a 1 (n) · a 1 (2²) + 1 2
²,
and that there is a strictly positive lower bound r¸2 ¡h ¤ on the probability of sticking to repeated play of the sequence f(
The lemma asserts that the total probability with which player 1 departs from repetitions of the sequence (by playing{ at one of the points of randomization) is bounded below one. Lemma 4 is essential because we can adapt its construction to build an equilibrium where player 1 is one of two di®erent types: type k always plays the¯xed sequence of actions and type 1 plays the sequence with occasional randomizations. By requiring the probability of type k to be su±ciently small (in particular it must be less than r), and by adjusting the probability that type 1 plays{, the actions of the two types will combine to reproduce the strategy3(N) and the optimal response by player 2 thus remains¿ (N ).
The Repeated Game of Incomplete Information
The de¯nition of individual rationality given in Section 3.1 applies to player 1's undiscounted payo®s. In discounted games as the players become more patient, player 2 is able to approximate these punishments arbitrarily closely. First we de¯ne the notion of ²-IR payo®s.
De¯nition 2 Let ² > 0 be given. The vector
(The notation 1 is used to denote a K¡ dimensional vector of 1's.) There is a lower threshold on the discounting, ± ² , so that if ± > ± ² then player 2 can hold player 1 down any ²-IR payo® in ¡(p; ±). Let Cav a(p) be the (pointwise) smallest concave function g(p) satisfying g(p)¸a(p) where a(p) is de¯ned in (1). Then Cav a(p) is the value for the zero-sum repeated game of incomplete information with no discounting that is played when player 2's payo®s are (¡A k (i; j)) k2K (e.g., Zamir (1992, p.126) ). Now consider the zero-sum discounted repeated game of incomplete information with the same payo®s.
The value function for this game, v ± (p), exists and satis¯es 0 Zamir (1992, pp.119-125) ). This implies that as ± ! 1 the punishments that can be imposed in the discounted game converge uniformly to the punishments that can be imposed in the undiscounted game (details of this¯nal step available on request).
The Folk Theorem for discounted repeated games of complete information, as usually stated, applies only to strictly individually rational payo®s. Likewise, we shall assume (in (A.1)) that we can¯nd strictly (by a margin of at least ¹ ²) individually rational payo®s for the repeated game of incomplete information ¡(p; ±).
(A.1) There exists (1 1 ;1 2 ; :::
We de¯ne strict individual rationality by a strict inequality and approachability, rather than in relation to the players' minmax levels. As in the complete information case there are always weakly individually rational payo®s, that is, there exists (1 k ) k2K 2 (¢ IJ ) K and an individually rational vector (! k ) k2K so that:
all k 2 K, but A.1 requires more. In particular, it implies that the game of complete information played between each type k and player 2 has strictly individually rational payo®s (G k (²) 6 = ; for some ² > 0) and thus it cannot be the case, for example, that one of player 1's types plays a zero-sum game with player 2. It is, nevertheless, a natural extension of the implicit restriction made in the complete information case.
Using A.1 we can now describe a particular equilibrium, which we refer to as the terminal equilibrium. The terminal equilibrium is revealing in the sense that there is an initial signalling phase, where each player signals her type with possible pooling, and no information is revealed thereafter. In general the incentive compatibility conditions (that each type should have no incentive to mimic another type) will bind most tightly at such an equilibrium. We therefore choose the payo®s at the equilibrium so type k receives a payo® close to ¹ a k (²): (This was why, in Lemma 4, terminal payo®s were restricted to be high.) The terminal equilibrium will serve to describe the players' long-run behaviour in ¡(p; ±), apart from on paths on which player 1 reveals herself to be type 1 earlier in the game.
Lemma 5 Given A.1, there exists an2 > 0 such that for all ² <2: there exists a ¹ ±(²) < 1 such that for all ± > ¹ ±(²) and all p 2 ¢ K the game ¡(p; ±) has an equilibrium with payo®s, (( ¹ ® 1 ; :::; ¹ ® K ); 1 ), that satisfy:
¡ C² for some constant C, independent of ² and ±, and for k = 1; 2; :::; K;
Proof: We start by constructing correlated strategies that give the players payo®s close to their maximum feasible and individually rational payo®s. Consider the convex set
D 0 has a non-empty interior, by A.1. D ² is de¯ned by K + 1 linear inequalities which are continuous in ² and become tighter as ² increases. De¯ne2 > 0 to be the largest ² such that D ² 6 = ; for all ² ·2. For k = 1; 2; :::; K and ² ·2, choose ¼
. We will de¯ne2 to be the largest
We will now show that there exists a constant C o , independent of ² and ±, so that
Let k be given and let
where ¼ y 2 D2. By linearity B(¼¸)¸¸(b +2) + (1 ¡¸)b, so ¼¸is a feasible solution to
De¯ne C k to be the term that multiplies ²; then for ² <2 and 8 k;
and note that C k is a constant independent of ² and ±. Consider again, for a¯xed k; the correlated strategy ¼¸. If¸¸²=2, then ¼¸satis¯es the constraint B(¼¸)¸b + 4². If¸²
² for all k 0 . This second condition follows from rearranging the below su±cient condition for the constraint:
(it is su±cient since the LHS of (24) is an upper bound for A k 0 (¼¸), while the RHS is
² by (23)). Thus ¼¸2 D ² if¸¸E², where E is a positive
for ² < x, for some x > 0, and thus a constant C o k exists such that for such that
sequences will be our equilibrium path actions. As (
, and player 1 will be punished for an observable deviation by being held down to! k + ² for all k:
In this proof we will choose ¹ ±(²) < 1 so that (i) ¹
1=K for all k. The second condition ensures that player 2 can hold the types of player 1 to within ² of any IR payo®s. The third ensures that the loss from signalling is at most ²=8 and the last condition will ensure that player 2 never gets less thanb + 3².
We now take ² <2 to be given. We now show that the following strategies are an equilibrium of ¡(p; ±): Player 2 begins by playing the¯xed sequence of actions associated with type 1, fj t 1 g, and if he observes player 1 deviating from her corresponding sequence fi t 1 g in period t, for t = 0; 1; :::; K ¡ 2, he interprets this move as a signal that player 1 is type k = t + 2. When type k is signalled he then begins to play out the sequence fj If player 1 deviates from the sequence fi t 1 g in period t > K ¡ 2, or deviates from the sequence fi t k g once type k has been signalled, then player 2 punishes these deviations by holding her to the payo®s (! k ) k2K + ²1 (de¯ned above). This is possible as ± > ± ² . Each of player 1's types plays a best response to this strategy of player 2 and minmaxes player 2 if he deviates from the above strategy.
If type k signals truthfully, then her expected payo® is bounded below by ¹ a k (3²) ¡
K implies that the payo®s over the¯rst K ¡ 1 periods contribute at most ²=8 to her total payo®.) Thus the optimal response of type k to 2's strategy must give her a
)², since she always has the option of signalling truthfully. Then once we have established equilibrium, the lower bound on equilibrium payo®s to player 1 will be as required with
. In general the optimal response for type k will be to signal some type k 0 (which may be k itself) and never to trigger the punishment from player 2. Suppose this is false, so that it is optimal for type k to signal type k 0 and to trigger the punishment after s periods of mimicking type k 0 . Her payo® from playing out the sequence f(i
in its entirety can be decomposed into her average payo® over the¯rst s periods, x, and her average payo® over the remaining
By the construction of the sequence of actions, at any point in time the continuation payo® satis¯es y¸A k (¼ ¤ k 0 (²)) ¡ ²=2. These two facts imply an upper bound on x:
Her payo® (discounted to the period after the signal is sent) from mimicking type k 0 and then deviating in period s is thus bounded above by
If she prefers to be punished from time s, then A k (¼ ¤ k 0 (²)) ·! k + 25²=16, because her payo® from continuing to play fi
¡²=2 by the construction of the action sequences, and the deviation payo® is at most (1¡±)M +±(! k +²) ·! k +²(1+1=16).
This upper bound for
) and the bound on ± implies that (25) is less than! k + 2². By the de¯nition of2 the payo®s (A k (¼ ¤ k (²)) k2K are 3²-IR, so this is strictly less than the payo® from truthful revelation, described above, which gives a contradiction. Likewise, an observable deviation during the signalling leads to a payo® of at most! k +²+ 1 8 ², which is less than the payo® from truthful revelation. Type k's equilibrium payo®s can now be broken down into a payo® from signalling and a payo® A k (¼ ¤ k 0 (²)) after signalling. This is bounded above by (1
². The upper bound on equilibrium payo®s is established.
Player 2's expected payo® is determined by playing at most K ¡ 1 arbitrary actions followed by one of the¯xed sequences f(i t k ; j t k )g. His equilibrium payo® is therefore no less than (1 ¡ ± K )(¡M ) + ± K (b + 4²). This lower bound is strictly greater thanb + 3² (by the fourth assumption on ±). This proves part (b) of the Lemma. His payo® from a deviation is at most (1 ¡ ±)(M ) + ±b, so we have also shown that player 2 cannot pro¯tably deviate from the strategy above.
Q.E.D.
The next result determines K ¡ 1 correlated strategies (¼ 2 ; :::; ¼ K ) 2 (¢ IJ ) K¡1 , and each correlated strategy ¼ k will be mimicked by the¯nite sequence of actions played by type k. It shows that: (a) each correlated strategy holds type 1 to her minmax level or lower; (b) normalizing for the e®ect on type 1's payo®, each correlated strategy satis¯es an incentive compatibility condition; (c) there is an individually rational point z 2 < K where type 1 receives her minmax payo® and type k > 1 receives a convex combination of her payo® ¹ a k and the payo® she gets from playing the correlated strategy, that is
, where the weight¸k is chosen to hold type 1 to her minmax level when using the same correlated strategy, ¹
Lemma 6 Assume A.1, then there exist correlated strategies (¼ 2 ; ::
(a) A 1 (¼ k ) ·â 1 for all k = 2; 3; :::; K,
for all k; k 0 = 2; 3; :::; K, (c) z is individually rational, where
Proof: Consider the constrained optimization
As ¹ a 1 >â 1 , by assumption A.1, the maximand is well de¯ned. As the constraint set is nonempty (by the Minimax Theorem) and compact there is a solution ¼ k 0 to the optimization for all k 0 > 1.
We aim to show that the point z, de¯ned above, is individually rational. We must, therefore, show that the set fxjx · zg is approachable. By Zamir (1992) , for example, it is su±cient to show that for any q 2 < K with q¸0 there exists a mixed action, g, for player 2 such that q((A 1 (i; g); :::; A K (i; g)) ¡ z) · 0; 8i 2 I: (27) Letĝ be a mixed strategy that ensures player 2 receives his minmax level (B(i;ĝ)¸b for all i 2 I) and letĝ 1 be a mixed strategy that minmaxes type 1 (A 1 (i;ĝ 1 ) ·â 1 for all i 2 I).
We will show that for any q¸0 either g =ĝ or g =ĝ 1 will ensure (27) holds. If (27) holds for all q when g =ĝ then there is nothing to prove. Suppose that for some q¸0 (27) does not hold with g =ĝ; then there exists i 2 I such that q((A 1 (i;ĝ); :::; A K (i;ĝ)) ¡ z) > 0.
By the de¯nition of ¹ a, ¹ a k¸Ak (i;ĝ), and together with the fact that q¸0, this implies q(¹ a ¡ z) > 0. A substitution from the de¯nition of z shows this is equivalent to
We must show that if (28) holds, q((A 1 (i;ĝ 1 ); :::; A K (i;ĝ 1 )) ¡ z) · 0 for all i 2 I. It is su±cient to show q((A 1 (¼); :::;
this is therefore maximized on the set of ¼'s with A 1 (¼) ·â 1 . The¯nal inequality then follows from (28). Thus if q((A 1 (i;ĝ); :::; A K (i;ĝ)) ¡ z) > 0 it must be true that q((A 1 (i;ĝ 1 ); :::; A K (i;ĝ 1 )) ¡ z) · 0. We can conclude that z is individually rational.
In Lemma 7 we de¯ne K ¡ 1¯nite sequences of actions that approximate the correlated strategies (¼ 2 ; :::; ¼ K ).
Lemma 7 For any ² > 0 there exists ± 0 (²) < 1, a¯nite integer T > 0 and K ¡ 1
, for k 0 = 2; 3; :::; K, such that for all 1 > ± > ± 0 (²):
:::; K; wherê
Proof: For k 0 = 2; 3; :::; K, let ¼(k 0 ) be a rational approximation to the correlated strat-
for k 0 = 2; 3; :::; K. There exists a positive integer T such that T ¼(k 0 ) ij is an integer for all k 0 = 2; 3; :::; K, i 2 I and j 2 J, (where ¼(k) ij denotes the ij th element of the correlated strategy ¼(k)). Choose the K ¡ 1 sequences so that the action pair (i; j) appears T ¼(k 0 ) ij times in the sequence f(i
. Continuity then ensures that there exists ± 0 (²) such that for all ± > ± 0 (²) the result holds.
We now prove our main result. It contains three main elements. The¯rst element of the proof is an investigation of the two-type game where only type 1 and type k are given positive probability by player 2. We describe an equilibrium of this game where the combined actions of the players (i.e., using the priors over player 1's types) replicate the strategies (3(N);¿ (N )), described in Lemma 4: type k repeatedly plays the¯nite sequence of Lemma 7, while type 1 occasionally randomizes. As there is strictly positive probability that this sequence is played out in full, provided the probability of type k is less than r, it is possible for the combined actions of the types to replicate the strategy3(N ). And if the sequence is played out in full the players settle down at the equilibrium described in Lemma 5. In this construction we will use Lemma 6 to de¯ne punishments. By Lemma 4
we can therefore deduce that, provided type 1 is given su±ciently high probability, there is an equilibrium where type 1's payo® is arbitrarily close to any a 1 2 [a 1 (0); ¹ a 1 (0)].
The second step is to add an initial random move by type 1 in the two-type game. At this random move type 1 reveals herself with a high probability and after this plays out an equilibrium of the full information game where player 2 receives the payo® b. Provided the probability of type 1 is su±ciently high, this allows us to¯nd an equilibrium of the twotype game where, for given º > 0; and given any pair (a 1 ; b) 2 G 1 (º); type 1's equilibrium payo® is close to a 1 and player 2's payo® is close to b. The¯nal step in the construction is an initial signalling phase where the types k 0 > 1 of player 1 signal their type and type 1 randomly mimics one of the types k 0 > 1. This is not simple to implement, because type 1 must be made indi®erent between mimicking all other types. To ensure her indi®erence it is necessary that player 2 randomizes in the period that type k signals and that the outcome of player 2's randomization determines the equilibrium of the two-type game that is subsequently played.
Theorem 3 Assume A.1 and let º > 0 be given. Then there exists ± º < 1, p º 1 < 1 such that for all p with p 1 > p º 1 and for all ± > ± º , given any (a 1 ; b) 2 G 1 (º) the game ¡(p; ±) has an equilibrium with the payo®s ((® 1 ; :::; ® K );¯) 2 < K+1 which satisfy
Proof: Some de¯nitions and notation: Choose Q > 0 to be a linear upper bound on the di®erence between ¹ a k (²) and ¹ a k for all ² 2 (0; ¹ ²) and for all k (where ¹ ² is de¯ned in Assumption 1); in particular, choose Q so that
(See, e.g., the argument for (23) in Lemma 5.) We will also de¯ne a non-negative constant R as follows (where ¼ k is de¯ned in Lemma 6):
From Lemma 6(b) we have that
; 8k; k 0 = 2; 3; :::; K: (33)
We will begin by assuming that this inequality is strict when k 6 = k 0 , that is,
; 8k; k 0 = 2; 3; :::; K; k 6 = k 0 : (34) (We will deal with the case of k 6 = k 0 satisfying (33) with equality at the end of the proof.)
Finally, Y is de¯ned to be the slope (with 2's payo®s in the numerator) of G 1 (0) when this set is a line segment (Int G 1 (0) = ;) and when Int G 1 (0) 6 = ; we de¯ne Y = 1. Y is bounded above and strictly positive by Assumption A.1.
Let ¶ > 0 be given, where ¶ < ¹ ². Choose ² > 0 so that: (i) 3² < ¶; (ii) for all k; k 0 = 2; 3; :::; K with k 6 = k 0 it is true that for all ± > ± 0 (²) 
non-empty by Assumption 1 and ¶ < ¹ ²; so the last inequality holds for small ²); (v) ¶ > [8(9=8) K¡2 ¡ 7]² maxfY; 1g. ((ii) is possible as we have assumed (34) and the payo®s from playing out the action sequences can be made arbitrarily close to the payo® from playing the correlated strategies
because the sets of ²-IR payo®s are convex and these sets converge to the set of IR payo®s as ² ! 0. So (a) as the point ¹ a is (2+(Q+2)(R+1))²-IR for ² su±ciently small, (b) the set of ²-IR payo®s is convex and converges to the set of IR payo®s as ² ! 0, and (c) the point z is IR, the convex combination (1¡¸)z+¸¹ a, for a given¸< 1 will be (2+(Q+2)(R+1))²-IR provided ² is su±ciently small.) Given this value for ², let T and ± 0 (²) be as de¯ned in Lemma 7, and setting ± ¤ (²) = ± 0 (²), let±(²) be as de¯ned in Lemma 4 (each of the K ¡ 1 nite sequences speci¯ed in Lemma 7 satis¯es the conditions of Lemma 4;±(²) depends on them only through T ). Choose ± ¶ = maxf±(²); ± ² ; ¹ ±(²); (4M=(4M + ²) 1=K g, where ± ² is de¯ned below De¯nition 2 and ¹ ±(²) is de¯ned in Lemma 5.
The Game with Two Types : arbitrary payo® for type 1
Let some type k > 1 be given. Recall that Lemma 4 de¯ned an equilibrium (3(N);¿ (N )) of the complete information game where, with occasional randomizations, type 1 and player 2 play out a¯nite sequence of actions N times and then settle on an equilibrium.
Recall also that type 1's average payo® over the¯nite sequence of actions f({
(de¯ned in Lemma 7) is not greater thanâ 1 + ² for all ± > ± 0 (²), and for all ± > ¹ ±(²) that the equilibrium de¯ned in Lemma 5 has payo®s, ( ¹ ® 1 ; ¹ ® 2 ; :::; ¹ ® K ; 1 ), that satisfy 1¸b + 3²
and
is non-empty by (iv) above); then by Lemma 4 with (a ¤ 1 ; b) = (¹ ® 1 ; 1 ); and by (iv), for all ± close to 1, there exists N and strategies which we denote as (3(k; N);¿ (k; N )) which constitute an equilibrium of © 1 (±), in which type 1 gets a payo® within 1 32
s=0 is played N times with occasional randomizations by type 1 and¯nally, if 1 has not deviated from the sequence, play settles on an equilibrium of © 1 (±) where the players receive the payo®s (¹ ® 1 ; 1 ). By Lemma 4, there is a probability of at least r, independent of ±, that type 1 ends up playing the equilibrium with payo®s (¹ ® 1 ; 1 ).
Let p with 0 < p 1 < s=0 N times and then plays out the strategy (for k) in the equilibrium of ¡(p; ±) with the payo®s ( ¹ ® 1 ; :::; ¹ ® K ; 1 ) given above. Deviations by player 2 from his equilibrium strategy are minmaxed.
Type 1 plays a strategy so that from player 2's perspective the combined actions of types 1 and k over the¯rst T N periods replicate the strategy3(k; N), de¯ned above, and, after T N periods of playing the sequence, type 1 settles down to play the equilibrium of ¡(p; ±) given above. Thus, in periods where3(k; N) requires player 1 to randomize with probability 1=2, type 1 actually deviates from the sequence with probability more than 1=2 to compensate for the fact that type k never deviates from the sequence. If r (where r > r) is the total probability that player 1 does not deviate from this sequence, then after T N periods player 2 has the prior (r ¡ (1 ¡ p 0 1 ))=r that player 1 is type 1. Provided we chose p 0 such that
, then playing the continuation equilibrium is feasible. Deviations by player 2 from his equilibrium strategy are minmaxed.
Player 2 will play out the strategy¿ (k; N ) on the equilibrium path over the¯rst T N periods with the terminal equilibrium of ¡(p; ±) given above being played thereafter, or one of the revealing equilibria if type 1 has revealed her type. However, if player 1 uses a pure action that deviates from her equilibrium strategy (i.e., a probability zero action), then player 2 responds in the following way. He¯rst calculates type 1's expected payo® if she were to continue playing out her strategy (and player 2 plays the actions described above); call this c. Then he takes the convex combination¸z + (1 ¡¸)¹ a, of the point z (de¯ned in (??)) and the point ¹ a (de¯ned in Lemma 6), that gives type 1 exactly the payo® c, that is,¸= (¹ a 1 ¡ c)=(¹ a 1 ¡â 1 ). By the construction above (point (iii) below (35)), since c >â 1 + ¶ ¡ ²=2 then this convex combination is (2 + (1 + R)(2 + Q))²-IR.
5
5 At the equilibrium strategy for type 1 described above, type 1's payo® at the start of each¯nite sequence is a convex combination ofÂ 1;k and the terminal equilibrium payo® ¹ ® 1 : (1 ¡ ± nT )Â 1;k + ± nT ¹ ® 1 , for some integer n · N. The integer n = N is chosen so that her equilibrium payo® (i.e., at the start of the¯rst round of the¯nite sequence) is within ²=32 of a 0 1¸â1 + ¶; and hence at leastâ 1 + ¶ ¡ ²=32: The payo® ¹ ® 1 is at least ¹ a 1 (3²) ¡ C² >â 1 + ¶ (by the assumption on ²): Allowing for the small integer e®ects which arise when playing out the¯nite sequence of actions, it is thus the case that her continuation payo® That is, there exists a vector of IR payo®s (! 1 ; ::::; ! K ) 2 < K such that (! 1 ; :::
Player 2 responds to a deviation of player 1 by holding each type k to a payo® of at most ! k + ², which is possible as ± > ± ² .
To show that these strategies form an equilibrium of the game ¡(p 0 ; ±) which gives positive probability only to types f1; kg, it is su±cient to show that type 1 and type k do not bene¯t by deviating from their equilibrium strategy. 6 Some deviations are not observed by player 2. We will¯rst concern ourselves with deviations that are immediately detected by player 2. It will be convenient to let c (as above) and d denote, respectively, type 1 and type k's equilibrium continuation payo®s at the start of the period in which the observed deviation occurred. We will¯rst show that type 1 does not bene¯t by deviating.
By the construction above, if ± > ± ² then type 1's expected payo® from deviation is at most (1 ¡ ±)M + ±(! 1 + ²), whereas her expected payo® from continuing, c, satis¯es c > ! 1 + 3²; our assumption on ± is su±cient to ensure a deviation is suboptimal.
Next, we show that type k cannot pro¯tably deviate from these strategies. Type k can make unobservable deviations from the equilibrium by mimicking type 1 revealing her type (by playing{ at a point of randomization), and then by continuing to mimic type 1, playing out an equilibrium of the game © 1 (±). It is possible that such a deviation is pro¯table. A small re-working of the players' strategies gives an equilibrium with the same payo® to type 1 and a greater payo® to type k, if this is the case. Let t denote the¯rst time at which this unobservable deviation is pro¯table for type k. Rede¯ne the players' equilibrium strategies, so that before time t all players use exactly the same actions and at time t both types play{ (the revealing action) and play out the strategies of the equilibrium of the game © 1 (±). (Player 2's strategy is exactly the same as before.)
This does not change type 1's equilibrium payo® because she was indi®erent at{. It raises type k's equilibrium payo®, because she prefers the deviation to the equilibrium. Player 2's payo®s also increase because the continuation equilibrium after{ was chosen to reward c at any point always exceedsâ 1 + ¶ ¡ ²=16. 6 Lemma 4 guarantees that type 1 is indi®erent between the positive probability actions in periods when she must randomize, and that player 2 is playing an optimal response to types 1 and k.
him for playing out the iterations of the¯nite sequence and he now receives this reward with higher probability. Finally, to verify that this is an equilibrium we must show that type k will not bene¯t from making an observable deviation at some later stage from the equilibrium of © 1 (±). We will address this in the parentheses after case (b) below. Now, we consider observable deviations by k from the equilibrium, which result in player 2 punishing player 1. By (36) there exists a vector of punishment payo®s ! such that
The¯nal inequality follows from (31), (17), type 1's payo® c satis¯es
and type k's continuation payo®, d, satis¯es j(1 ¡
. These inequalities, and (32), substituted in (37), imply that ! k + (3 + R)² < d; thus a deviation for type k is not pro¯table in this case (by the assumption on ±). Now let us consider case (b). Assume the observed deviation occurred t periods after{ was played, so an equilibrium of © 1 (±) has been played for the last t periods. Let the sequence f(i s ; j s )g 1 s=0 have as an initial point the move ({;| 0 ) and then include the sequence of actions played by the two players at this equilibrium. Let
s payo® in the period she deviates and the subsequent payo®s from the punishment. Her continuation payo® from playing{ and then making an observable deviation satis¯es
Let d 0 denote type k's continuation payo® from not playing{, but from abiding by her equilibrium strategy. The unobservable followed by the observable deviation is optimal
. The above implies that this is equivalent to
By the above construction of a pooling equilibrium, we can assume that the¯rst term on the RHS is non-positive. The¯nal term on the RHS is less that ( [In the pooling equilibrium, described in the previous paragraph, type k and type 1 each play out the equilibrium of © 1 (±). Type k bene¯ts by a subsequent observable deviation if (1 ¡ ±)
. We can then use (37) to get a contradiction again.]
2. The game with two types : arbitrary payo® for type 1 and player 2
The strategies above are an equilibrium, so, given any ± > ± ¶ , a ;¯¤) ¡ (a 1 ; b)k < ² for any pair (a 1 ; b) 2 G 1 ( ¶) with a 1 < ¹ a 1 (3²) ¡ C². To do this it is necessary to alter the period zero strategies of the equilibrium described in part 1. Now type 1 randomizes in period zero | with probability 1 ¡ ¹ she plays out the equilibrium just described where a 0 1 is set equal to a 1 , and with probability ¹ she reveals her type by playing{ 6 ={ 0 , and play then follows an equilibrium of the complete information game in which¯rst-period actions are ({;| 0 ). As in the previous part, we can choose the equilibrium in the complete information game so that type 1 is indi®erent between the two¯rst-period actions{ and{
denote the payo®s, discounted to period 0, type 1 and player 2 receive conditional on{ being played in the¯rst period. As type 1 randomizes in the¯rst periodã 1 =® 1 , soã 1 is within 1 32
² of a 1 and we can therefore also choseb to be within
and ² < ¶). The arguments above imply that this will also be an equilibrium for ± > ± ¶ , provided player 2 has the priors p 0 after{ 0 is observed in the¯rst period. Type 1 and player 2's expected payo®s from these strategies are (® and by Lemma 4, r > r, where r > 0 is independent of ± and a 1 , so a su±cient condition for this is 1¡p ²=6M we have found an equilibrium of ¡(p 00 ; ±) with the desired properties. (If type k prefers to mimic the revelation action of type 1 at date 0; then the strategies can be amended as in part 1 to re-establish equilibrium.) When K = 2 the choice of ¶ = minfº; ¹ ²=2g proves the Theorem.
3. The game with many types K > 2
We now describe the players' strategies in the repeated game of incomplete information ¡(p; ±) where all types are given positive probability, and show that these strategies are an equilibrium with payo®s satisfying (30). The play in the game is divided into a signalling phase, where all types are given positive probability, and a payo® phase where only two types of player 1 are given positive probability.
Periods t=0,1,...,K-3 : The Signalling Phase: The players use the following strategies: Type k, where k = 2; 3; :::; K ¡1, plays action i t = 1 in periods t = 0; 1; :::; k ¡3
and in period t = k ¡ 2 she plays action i = 2 to signal her type. Type K plays action i t = 1 in periods t = 0; 1; :::; K ¡ 3. Type 1 chooses a type k = 2; 3; :::; K with probability Á k and mimics her signalling strategy. (All of the types of player 1 minmax player 2 if she chooses a pure action that is not played with positive probability in the signalling phase.)
Player 2 plays action j = 1 with probability q 0 and action j = 2 with probability 1 ¡ q 0 in period zero. If, in period t < K ¡ 2, player 1 used action i = 1 in all past periods, then player 2 plays action j = 1 with probability q t (h t¡1 ) and action j = 2 with probability 1 ¡ q t (h t¡1 ), where h t¡1 is the history of player 2's past actions up to t ¡ 1. (If player 2 observes a deviation in period t · K ¡ 3 then he plays the punishments described above for the 2-type game with the types f1; t + 2g.)
After the signalling: At the end of the signalling phase only two types of player 1, f1; kg, will be given positive probability by player 2. The players then play an equilibrium described in part 2 of the proof; however, the equilibrium they play will depend on the entire sequence of actions player 2 plays during the signalling phase; h t¡1 .
We will begin by considering the case where Int G 1 (0) 6 = ;. Let (a 1 ; b) be a point in
be chosen su±ciently small to ensure this is possible). Here we introduce notation for the open rectangle centred at the point (x; y) with width W and height H, that is, U[(x 1 ; x 2 ); W; H] := f (x; y) 2 < 2 j jx ¡ x 1 j < 0:5W; jy ¡ y 1 j < 0:5H g:
We will show how the continuation equilibria after the signalling can be chosen to give the players incentives to randomize. We will also show that after the signalling phase player 2's posterior beliefs will still attach positive probability to type 1, and as p 1 ! 1 these posteriors give arbitrarily high probability to type 1. Thus, it is possible to choose p 1 su±ciently high for the equilibrium (described above) of the game with two types can be played after the signalling phase. We also show that the signalling strategies give the players payo®s close to (a 1 ; b).
Let (® k;j 1 ;¯k ;j ) denote the continuation equilibrium payo®s to type 1 and player 2 when player 1 signals type k and player 2 plays action j in the period the signal was sent.
We will start in the¯nal signalling period t = K ¡ 3. We will choose the continuation equilibria in period K ¡ 3 with payo®s that satisfy when Int G 1 (0) 6 = ;, as assumed for the moment; however it will be convenient to retain the general notation for the case when Int G 1 (0) = ;.) It is possible to choose such continuation equilibria, because the sets on the right of (38) and (39) are in Int G 1 ( ¶) \ f(x; y)jx < ¹ a 1 (3²)¡C²g and part 2 of the proof, therefore, applies. Continuation equilibria satisfying (38) and (39) can be found, because (by (17) and part 1) type 1's payo® can be approximated to within ²=16 and by part 2 player 2's payo® can be approximated to within ²=2. Given this choice of continuation equilibria in period K ¡ 3 we will show that players' expected payo®s at the start of period K ¡ 3 (potential continuation equilibria for period K ¡ 4) lie in the set U[(a . This will furnish an inductive step. In period K ¡ 3 type 1 randomizes between i = 1 and i = 2. Her payo®s from these actions are:
(A 1 (i; q K¡3 ) is an abuse that denotes type 1's stage-game payo® from action i when player 2 plays (q K¡3 ; 1 ¡ q K¡3 ) .) Player 1 is indi®erent between these two actions if
Let (¹; 1 ¡ ¹) denote the probability player 1 plays i = 1 and i = 2 in period K ¡ 3 given the observed history. If we abuse our notation in a similar fashion as before, player 2 is indi®erent between action j = 1 and j = 2 when
We can¯nd q K¡3 2 [0; 1] and ¹ 2 [0; 1] to make both players indi®erent. First, the LHS of (40) is less than ²=16 (by our assumption on ±) and the LHS of (41) is less than
in absolute value (2M is the maximum variation in player 1's payo®s so 2Y M is the maximum variation in player 2's). The assumption on the continuation equilibria implies that the RHS of (40) , the¯rst square bracket on the RHS is in (Y ²; 3Y ²) and the second is in the interval (¡3Y ²; ¡Y ²), we get The paragraph above describes potential continuation equilibria after period K ¡ 4 of the signalling phase (assuming type K ¡ 2 is not signalled). We will use this to describe an equilibrium for period K ¡ 4 onward with payo®s in U [(a
To build this equilibrium it is¯rst necessary to describe behaviour in period K ¡ 3.
Repeat the argument of the previous paragraph with the sets in (38) and (39) The construction gives type 1 and player 2 period-zero expected payo®s in the set U [(a 1 ; b); ¶; ¶]. We must check that in all the continuation equilibria p 1 is su±ciently large.
Given the lower bounds on player 1's probabilities derived above, each possible history of player 1's signalling-phase actions occurs with at least probability ( ) K¡1 for all k > 1).
We now show that no player wishes to deviate from her/his equilibrium strategies in the equilibrium with many types. As argued, under the assumption on ± and (a 1 ; b) player 2's continuation payo® is within ¶ of b during the entire signalling phase and hence greater thanb+ ¶, whereas a deviation yields at mostb+²=2, which by ² < ¶=2 is thus unpro¯table.
Thereafter, whichever types are signalled player 2 does not bene¯t from deviating by Lemma 4. A similar argument coupled with part 2 of this proof ensures that type 1 does not bene¯t by deviating from the strategies described above and neither does type k bene¯t by deviating when she has signalled that she is type k, because the losses during the signalling phase are su±ciently small. The four possible extra deviations that can arise when there are many types are: type k mimics type k 0 (unobservable), type k mimics type k 0 and then deviates to take a punishment (unobservable then observable), type k mimics type k 0 and later she plays{ and then mimics type 1 at a revealing equilibrium (unobservable), or type k mimics type k 0 , later she plays{ and then mimics type 1 beforē nally deviating from the revealing equilibrium to take a punishment (unobservable then observable). We will begin by showing that these deviations are not pro¯table when the strategy of type k 0 is to play the strategy described and then treat the case when the amended strategies are followed, as described in part 1 of the proof. Suppose type k sends the signal of type k 0 and then plays out her¯nite sequence N 0 times before settling at the equilibrium described in Lemma 5. From (29) her payo® from this, discounted to the period after the signalling is¯nished, is (1 ¡ ± T N 0 )Â k;k 0 + ± T N 0 ¹ ® k , whereas her payo® from playing her equilibrium strategy can be written as (1 ¡ ± T N )Â k;k + ± T N ¹ ® k . At an equilibrium type 1 will mimic type k and type k 0 with positive probability. Let c be type 1's expected equilibrium payo® from mimicking type k and c 0 be her expected payo® from mimicking type k 0 , that is,
The following will be a su±cient condition to rule out the¯rst form of deviation described above:
or equivalently
where the last inequality follows from substitution for (1¡± T N ) from (43) and for (1¡± T N 0 ) from (44). Type 1 randomizes between mimicking type k and type k 0 in equilibrium. The signalling phase payo® plus c and the signalling phase payo® plus c 0 give type 1 identical payo®s. The signalling phase payo®s contribute at most ²=2, so jc ¡ c 0 j < ². Also (35) applies, so the above inequality holds and it is optimal for type k to play her equilibrium strategy. We can now consider the second form of deviation. Suppose that type k mimics type k 0 and then deviates (before N 0 iterations are played) when type 1's continuation payo® is c. The strategies described in part 1 of the proof impose the same punishment on type k as the punishment she would have received if she had truthfully signalled her type and then deviated when type 1's continuation payo® was c (she can get the same deviation payo® by signalling truthfully). A repetition of the above argument shows that this latter option is strictly preferred to the former, and hence a fortiori type k prefers to use her equilibrium strategy. If the third type of deviation gives type k more than her equilibrium payo® a small emendation of the above strategies restores an equilibrium.
To do this replace type k's strategy with her mimicking player k 0 and then playing{ in this way and remove the stage of the signalling phase where type k is signalled. This new equilibrium increases player 2's expected payo® when type k 0 is signalled and so will increase his willingness to abide by his equilibrium strategy (if there are more than two types for which this deviation is pro¯table, each type can likewise play the signal which she prefers). If the fourth type of deviation is optimal then type k must bene¯t from an observable deviation from the equilibrium of the complete information game after{ was signalled. In this case the argument in parentheses at the end of part 1 of this proof applies mutatis mutandis. A small change to the above strategies restores an equilibrium. Change type k's equilibrium strategy so that she plays exactly the same actions as type k 0 until the¯nal playing of the equilibrium described in Lemma 5, that is, so that both k and k 0 signal at the same time (and in the same way) and so that the period in the signalling phase where type k was signalled is removed. Note that conditions (a)-(c) of Lemma 6 still apply when ¼ k is replaced by ¼ k 0 ; so the previous argument can be repeated mutatis mutandis. Any remaining indi®erences can be handled in exactly the same way.
Let R( ¶) denote the set of points (a 1 ; b) in the relative interior of G 1 ( ¶) \ f(x; y)jx < ¹ a 1 (3²) ¡ C²g that are distance at least ¶ from the boundary of the relative interior of G 1 ( ¶) \ f(x; y)jx < ¹ a 1 (3²) ¡ C²g. We have shown that there exists a ± ¶ < 1 and p ¶ 1 < 1 such that for all p with p 1 > p ¶ 1 and ± > ± ¶ , given any (a 1 ; b) 2 R( ¶) the game ¡(p; ±) has an equilibrium with payo®s that satisfy k(® 1 ;¯) ¡ (a 1 ; b)k < ¶: By choosing ¶ < º and su±ciently small the Theorem follows.
Q.E.D..
